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ABSTRACT
It is standardly claimed in loop quantum gravity (LQG) that spacetime both disappears, fundamentally,
and emerges from spin-networks in the low energy regime. In this paper, I critically explore these claims
and develop a variety of substantival and relational interpretations of LQG for which these claims are
false. According to most of the interpretations I consider, including the “received interpretation", it is in
fact false that spacetime emerges from spin-networks. In the process of supporting these claims, I also
explain why spacetime is thought to be missing from the theory’s fundamental ontology and demonstrate
how this conclusion depends on our interpretation of the theory. In fact, I will argue that for a variety
of interpretations spacetime survives quantization just as the electromagnetic field survives quantization.
The upshot of the following analysis is a much needed clarification of the ontology of LQG and how it
relates, or fails to relate, to the spacetime of general relativity.
1. Introduction
In the literature on canonical loop quantum gravity (LQG), one
finds the following claims:
The quanta of the field cannot live in spacetime:
they must build “spacetime" themselves... Physi-
cal space is a quantum superposition of spin net-
works...a spin network is not in space it is space.
(Rovelli 2004, p.9, 21)
One influential idea based on so-called ‘weave-
states’ proposes that the spacetime structure emerges
from appropriately benign, i.e. semi-classical, spin-
networks. (Huggett and Wüthrich 2013, p.279)
Such claims suggest that spacetime is not fundamental, that
there are physical objects or structures outside of spacetime
and that spacetime is generated by or constructed from these
fundamental, non-spatiotemporal “spin-networks".1 In this pa-
per, I will attempt four primary tasks:
1. Explicate certain aspects of the formal structure of canon-
ical LQG that are useful for analyzing the status of space-
time in LQG.
2. Explain why spacetime is thought to be missing in LQG.
3. Outline a variety of novel interpretations of LQG, each
with different ontological commitments.
4. Critically assess the claim that spacetime emerges from
spin-networks in light of these various interpretations.
I will demonstrate that there are clear and well motivated inter-
pretations of LQG for which it is false that spacetime emerges
from spin-networks either because spacetime does not disap-
pear after all or because there are no spin-networks for space-
time to emerge from. In order to explicate the ontology of
ORCID(s):
1See also Smolin (2002, p.138), Wüthrich (2006, p.169) and Oriti (2014,
p.15).
LQG, in §3 and §4 I will answer the following questions on
behalf of different interpretations of the theory:
1. In providing a quantum theory of general relativity, does
LQG describe spacetime as having gone missing funda-
mentally?
2. Are spin-networks (s-knots) included in the ontology of
LQG?
3. Is spacetime emergent from or composed of spin-networks
(s-knots)?
I will demonstrate that our answers to these questions depend
heavily upon our interpretation of themathematics of LQG and
upon what we take spacetime to be.
The following account explores only the ontology of canon-
ical LQG and does not address the ontology of covariant LQG
or the closely related, group field theory approach to quantum
gravity. Though this lacuna is regrettable, there are good rea-
sons for it, namely, most of the current philosophical work on
LQG takes place within the confines of the canonical approach
(see the references in §3.2), and it is this literature that I hope
to clarify and amend. On this topic, while there are philo-
sophical treatises on LQG which also explicate some of the
formal structure of canonical LQG, e.g. Wüthrich (2006) and
Crowther (2016), what is distinct about my approach is its fo-
cus on the ontology of the theory rather than on the formalism
itself. I introduce enough of the formalism as a means to end,
a means for (a) understanding the putative ontology of the the-
ory, (b) demonstrating how our understanding of the ontology
has changed over the course of the theory’s formal develop-
ment, and (c) dispelling ontological inconsistencies which are
endorsed in the philosophy of LQG literature due to a lack of
care in dealing with (b).
This paper is motivated by the fact that, in general, presen-
tations of LQG do not take appropriate care in explicating the
ontology of the theory and often employ evocative language
which, when taken literally and as a whole, is inconsistent.
The primary reason for these inconsistencies is that our un-
derstanding and interpretation of LQG has evolved alongside
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the development of the theory. As different pieces of the for-
mal puzzle of LQG have been solved, our interpretation of the
theory has evolved in response. And this, of course, is to be
expected. Unfortunately, however, the various stages of our
evolving-interpretation of LQG are all presented together in
treatise on LQG, either explicitly or implicitly, rather than a
single interpretation being presented throughout. Because a
mixed and inconsistent ontology is presented in accounts of
canonical LQG, philosophers have made mistaken or confused
inferences regarding spacetime, its emergence, and its relation-
ship to spin-networks.
In this paper, I present two families of interpretationswhich
fall squarely across the substantival-relational divide. The re-
lational interpretation is championed by Carlo Rovelli and has
been taken up by most philosophers writing on the subject.
Since the Rovellian view has become the “received account"
amongst philosophers, I spend a disproportionate amount of
time developing substantival interpretations to help balance
the philosophy literature. To this point, it is important to note
that LQGposes no new threat to substantivalism over and above
that which is already present in general relativity (GR) and to
some extent in Newtonian mechanics. Unfortunately, this fact
is often obscured in the literature and many even suggest that
manifold substantivalism comes under attack in LQG:
Canonical loop quantum gravity ends up anyway
replacing the spacetime continuum [e.g. mani-
fold] with something more radical. (Oriti 2014,
p.2, fn 3)
This view is not sequestered to academic discussions but has
trickled out into the public’s imagination. In a recent issue
of Scientific American, physicist Lajos Diósi is quoted as say-
ing “we know for sure that there will be a total scrambling of
the spacetime continuity if you go down to the Planck scale"
(Folger 2019, p.51). Read charitably, there is a loose sense
in which these authors are right; taken literally however, their
claims regarding the continuum of spacetime are false. In the
transition fromGR to LQG, what is scrambled is not the space-
time continuum but the geometric properties associated with
it (§2.4). In short, despite suggestions to the contrary, if one
were a manifold substantivalist with respect to GR, one could
remain a manifold substantivalist with respect to LQG.
One final caveat, in the course of discussing the ontology of
LQG – I will make use of a variety of physical and philosophi-
cal concepts: quantization, emergence, substantivalism and re-
lationism, for example, and yet I do not provide anything like
a complete account or overview of how these concepts have
been used in GR and how they might be used in LQG. Histor-
ically there are two senses in which spacetime might be sub-
stantival. The first sense identifies the spacetime manifold as
being the locus of the substantivalist’s conviction. The idea
here is that spacetime is a substantival container of physical
objects and events in virtue of there being a real manifold of
spacetime points. Here the emphasis is on the manifold, and
it is this manifold of points which comes under attack in Ear-
man and Norton’s infamous hole argument (1987). The sec-
ond sense arises in the context of general relativity and identi-
fies the metric field as being the locus of the substantivalist’s
conviction. The idea here is that the substance of spacetime
is encoded not in the manifold but in the dynamical geome-
try of GR. This geometry is substantival or, at least, nonrela-
tional, since nontrivial spacetime geometry carries energy and
can exist despite there being no matter in the universe to me-
diate its existence (Hoefer 1996, Read 2018, Martens 2019,
and more critically, Rynasiewicz 1996). Now, whether or not
spacetime disappears fundamentally in LQG turns on whether
or not spacetime is substantival or relational andwhether or not
substantival spacetime is encoded in the manifold, in the geo-
metric field or, perhaps, in both. I take no stance on this issue
and will track relationalism as well as both approaches to sub-
stantivalism through the quantization of GR and into LQG.2
Outline:
§2. Formal aspects of LQG
§3. Interpretations and spacetime disappearance
§4. Emergence
§5. Conclusion
2. Formal aspects of LQG
In this section, I explicate the theory of LQG for physics-
informed nonspecialists. The primary motivation for explicat-
ing the following mathematic is so that we might better under-
stand the ontology of LQG and in particular, the nature of spin-
networks (s-knots) and their relation to spacetime. In particu-
lar, there are important interpretive issueswhich turn on formal
features of the “Gauss" and “diffeomorphism" constraints, as
we shall see in §2.2 and §2.3.
Now, since there is no interpretation-free manner of ex-
pressing the content of a physical theory, in the following, I
will adopt languagewhich is explicitly substantival. My choice
in doing so is motivated by the literature itself, for, though the
received interpretation of LQG, amongst philosophers, is ul-
timately relational, almost all formal accounts of LQG begin
with language favorable to manifold substantivalism. Consider
for instance:
Nowadays, this approach is mostly pursued in a
different form, based on ideas of Ashtekar. The
idea of “splitting" spacetime [] into 3-dimensional
slices [Σ], and conceiving dynamics as evolution
from one slice to another, remains; but the ba-
sic dynamical variable is now, not a 3-geometry,
but a 3-connection... (Isham and Butterfield 1999,
p.22)
2There is a third possibility; Martens (2019) has noted that were space-
time emergent it might not be properly characterized as being either relational
or substantival. On the one hand, emergent spacetime is not an independent,
primitive substance since its existence is conditionalized on some other phys-
ical structure – namely “spin-networks". However since this structure is not
matter, emergent spacetime is not technically relational either. The point is
that if spacetime is emergent, then there is a third type of classification dis-
tinct from either substantivalism or relationalism.
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Here and elsewhere, the bare manifold is referred to as being
spacetime.3 It is unclear how literal Chris Isham and Jeremy
Butterfield intended to be interpretedwhenmaking such claims.
It is usually assumed that one needs both  as well as some
metric 푔 in order to have a structure rich enough to represent
spacetime (Einstein 1961, p.155; Maudlin 1990, p.245). Thus,
I suspect that when the aforementioned physicists refer to
as being spacetime or the spacetime manifold, they are sim-
ply using convenient language to speak of mathematics only
and are not endorsing a position on what physical spacetime
is. I, on the other hand, will continue to assume (at least for
the time being) that the bare manifold represents a substan-
tival spacetime.
According to this brand of substantivalism, LQG is a the-
ory of quantum geometry and not a theory of spacetime or
quantum spacetime. It might not be obvious what the dif-
ference is between these options, but this will become clear
in §3.1. According to the initial interpretation to be devel-
oped, the world consists of a bare substantival spacetime man-
ifold represented by , which happens to be overlaid with a
geometrically charged network of relations holding between
spacetime points.4 The ontology of LQG is quantum since the
geometry associated with this charged network is quantumme-
chanical. What geometrically charged networks are and how
they are represented in the theory will be explained shortly. I
will refer to this brand of substantivalism, nonpejoratively, as
naïve substantivalism, though perhaps a more accurate term
would have been ‘naïve manifold substantivalism’.
Admittedly, we ought not be completely satisfiedwith naïve
substantivalism as the bare manifold lacks the geometric struc-
ture which we have come to associate with spacetime. I will
address this concern in §3.1 by constructing alternative inter-
pretations of LQG and of spacetime. To reiterate then, in order
to express LQG qua a physical theory over and above a system
of mathematics, one must adopt some interpretation and, for
this purpose, I have adopted naïve substantivalism. My con-
cern at this point is to provide an introduction to some aspects
of the theory’s formal structure and not to debate the merits or
demerits of the naïve interpretation. Soon enough, alternative
interpretations will be developed and analyzed.
2.1. Spin-networks and S-knots
The theory of LQG begins with a Hamiltonian formulation
of GR and proceeds to quantize the theory by quantizing the
gravitational field following an approach developed by Paul
Dirac. Dirac’s procedure is the “canonical" route for quan-
tizing classical theories.5 At the end of the day, our physical
system will be represented by a quantum state in some Hilbert
space. However, since, as we shall see, the manifold plays an
important role in defining the relevant Hilbert space, I will of-
ten refer to the ordered pair ⟨,Ψ⟩ as being a model of the
physical system of LQG.
3See also Oriti (2014, p.5) and Markopolou and Smolin (2007, p.2)
4If there is matter or energy in the world, then the world includes these
items as well.
5For technical details on canonical quantum gravity, see Isham (1991,
1992), Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992), Rovelli (2004), Thiemann (2007),
Kiefer (2012) and Chiou (2015).
In the case of general relativity, canonical quantization en-
tails that the physical Hilbert space associated with our system
is captured by solving three “constraints" (Isham 1992, p.34–
35; Baez and Muniain1994, p.445; Rovelli 2004, p.145–147,
233). In general, constraints are associated with gauge orbits
through phase space. A state which evolves along one of these
orbits is thought to undergo no physical evolution. Thus, in
solving for these constraints, one is constructing a space of
physically possible objects which have the correct set of phys-
ical degrees of freedom. The “Gauss constraint" requires that
the states be invariant under SU(2) transformations, the “vec-
tor" or “diffeomorphism constraint" requires that the states be
invariant under spatial differomorphisms, and the “scalar" or
“Hamiltonian constraint" requires that the states be invariant
under reparameterizations of time (Gambini and Pullin 2011,
p.93–94; Rovelli 2004, p.146, 225). Whatever the physical
world is, it will be represented by some quantum state, Ψ,
which solves these constraints. Hitherto, only two of the con-
straints, the Gauss and diffeomorphism constraints, have been
solved. I will spend a bit of time explaining the construction of
the Hilbert space of states which solve these constraints, since
these constraints influence our interpretation of the states and
are important for understanding why spacetime is thought to
be missing from the theory’s fundamental ontology.
2.2. Gauss Constraint
I will explain first the Gauss constraint and then the diffeo-
morphsim constraint. At each stage, I will provide the naïve in-
terpretation of the states which solve the relevant constraint(s),
and will thereby unpack, in stages, the naïve ontology. In de-
veloping the theory of LQG, Rovelli implicitly endorses the
naïve interpretation up through the Gauss-stage and then jetti-
sons it when considering the diffeomorphism constraint (2004,
p.238). Contrary to Rovelli, I will push the naïve interpreta-
tion through the diffeomorphism constraint-stage as ameans of
fleshing out the naïve interpretation. In §3, I will argue that it
is this change in interpretation which Rovelli and others adopt
whenmoving from the Gauss to the diffeomorphism constraint
which has led some into fundamental confusion over the on-
tology of the theory. But more on this later.
In the following few paragraphs, I will provide some math-
ematical aspects of LQG; if the reader wishes to skip these de-
tails they are invited to do so. What is important to take away
from the following discussion is that each state which passes
the first test for being “physical", i.e. which solves the Gauss
constraint, is built from looking at networks in. At the end
of this subsection, I will provide the naïve interpretation for
what ontology these states represent.
According to theHamiltonian formulation ofGR, one rewrites
Einstein’s field equations in terms of new variables, a “spin-
connection",, and “tetrad fields",  . It turns out that the met-
ric field, 푔, can be decomposed in terms of tetrad fields and the
relevant spin-connection can be defined by  in a manner anal-
ogous to the Levi-Civita connection (Rovelli 2004, p.34). In
LQG, our quantum states are functionals of the spin-connection.
A generic spin-connection is an 픰픲(2)-valued one-form which
associates to each point in  an element from this Lie alge-
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bra (픰픲(2)). Given that these algebraic elements will even-
tually be converted to concrete matrices, we can think of the
spin-connection as assigning a, possibly unique, matrix to ev-
ery point in space. The task is to carve this very large space of
functionals (of the spin-connection) down to a physical Hilbert
space of states which solve the aforementioned constraints.
In order to solve the Gauss constraint, one first identifies
a graph of links (lines) and nodes (points) embedded in the
mathematical manifold, . The links of the graph are “col-
ored" by associating to them some representation of the SU(2)
group. Every link is assigned a potentially different represen-
tation.6 In addition to associating a color to each link, one
must also color the nodes where the links meet. In essence,
to color a link is to select a special vector which intertwines
the vector spaces associated with the colorings of the different
links. A colored network in is called a “spin-network". For
our purposes, the remaining details on how these networks are
constructed and colored are not important. What is important
is that the states, or functionals of , which solved the Gauss
constraint are constructed with reference to networks embed-
ded in.
Figure 1: We “color" certain graphs in the sub-manifold Σ of  with
quantum gravitational information. Colored graphs are called spin-networks
and are used to construct the Hilbert space of spin-network states. We
identify a spin-network state with each embedded network.
One can associate to each embedded spin-network a unique
gauge-invariant functional of the spin-connection called a spin-
network state, Ψ, (Rovelli and Upadhya 1998, p.3). These
states form a basis of the Hilbert space of functionals which
solve the Gauss constraint:
topological
spin-network
∈
}
⇒ |Γ(푥⃗), 푗푛, 푖푚⟩ ≡ Ψ. (1)
The embedded graph Γ(푥⃗) is a continuous series of links and
nodes. The 푗푛 keep track of which links (푛) havewhat algebraicspin information (푗) and the 푖푚 keep track of which nodes (m)have what algebraic information (푖).
I will stipulate, as part of the naïve interpretation, that struc-
tures on , which happen to be picked out by the physical
states of LQG, are to be physically interpreted in a fairly literal
way. Consequently, since spin-networks are embedded struc-
tures in  and are picked out by vector states of the gauge
6In constructing the Hilbert space of spin-networks, one takes holonomies
along the curves of the graph which convert the algebraic elements of 픰픲(2)
into matrices acting on some vector space. Which matrix is produced by this
process depends, in part, on the representation associated with the curve.
Figure 2: The naïf interprets embedded structures in  as literally model-
ing spatially-embedded graphs.
invariant Hilbert space, the ontology of LQG, according to the
naïf, includes quantum gravitationally “charged" substantival
graphs (Figures 1 & 2). These graphs are not mathematical
objects but are composed of spacetime points which are them-
selves physical objects according to the naïf. These graphs
are gravitationally charged, for, as we shall see, LQG repre-
sents them as having suitably quantized gravitational proper-
ties (equations (4) and (5)) encoded by the 픰픲(2)-field. There
are times when Rovelli implicitly adopts this ontology (2004,
p.147–150), even though, at the end of the day, he rejects this
interpretation in favor of a relational view (§3.2). I want to
note here that it is the network as a whole which represents
a quantum mechanical structure of LQG since it is the entire
network which is associated with a state in our Hilbert space.
Since generic sub-networks in the manifold do not correspond
with states in our Hilbert space, we will not interpret them as
representing an item of quantum ontology in LQG.
Although I have not yet discussed the observables of LQG
(§2.4), on a substantival reading, these observables predicate
properties of spacetime. For instance, a three-dimensional re-
gion of spacetime which includes a highly charged node is said
to have a large volume and a two-dimensional surface of space-
time which is intersected by a highly charged link is said to
have a large area (Figure 3). The ontology that one should
have in mind at this stage in the development of the naïve inter-
pretation is that of a charged network embedded in the fabric
of spacetime which is responsible for producing the geomet-
ric properties associated with spacetime. This interpretation is
cleanest at the level of the Gauss constraint. In order to solve
the diffeomorphism constraint, wewill have to reconsider what
we take the new, more constrained set of states to represent.
How to interpret states which are diffeomorphically invariant
is the question where the received interpretation begins to part
ways with naïve substantivalism.
2.3. Diffeomorphism Constraint
The diffeomorphism constraint requires that our physical
states be invariant under smooth stretching and shifting of the
corresponding network around the manifold. This constraint
presents a problem if our states are defined with respect to par-
ticular network-embeddings in. Networks which are bolted
down to defined locations in are not invariant under diffeo-
morphisms. Therefore, in implementing the diffeomorphism
constraint, our mathematical states are promoted from being
tied to particular spin-networks embedded at specific places to
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equivalence classes, under diffeomorphisms, of such networks
(Rovelli 2004, p.238–242). How this is formally achieved is
not important for our purposes. What is important is that the
new states,Ψknt, are no longer associated with a single network(|Γ(푥⃗), 푗푛, 푖푚⟩) but with all networks related to |Γ(푥⃗), 푗푛, 푖푚⟩ bya diffeomorphism. Effectively, we have collapsed the space of
spin-network states into an equivalence class under diffeomor-
phisms.7
Once we have imposed the diffeomorphism constraint, the
manner in which a graph is embedded is erased from the mem-
ory of the state, Ψknt. All that the states, Ψknt, encode aboutthe old spin-networks is algebraic in nature: a “knot class",
퐾 , and a “coloring", 푐 (Rovelli 2004, p.241). Now, this is not
quite right as the global structure of the manifold continues
to constrain the set of Ψknt states. While this is not usuallyemphasized in philosophical discussions, the global topolog-
ical structure of the manifold constrains the initial set of em-
bedded spin-networks with which we began (§2.2). For in-
stance, a manifold which has a compact dimension (such as
an infinitely long cylinder) will allow a different set of em-
bedded networks from that allowed by ℝ4 and therefore each
choice of manifold might select out a different originating set,
of spin-network states. Thus, in constructing the s-knot states
and implementing the diffeomorphism constraint, the global
topological structure of the manifold continues to inform the
set of states we are considering. The important point, though,
is that our s-knot states don’t include any information about
networks being embedded at particular places in the manifold.
Thus, while global topological properties of the manifold play
a background role in defining our s-knot states, local topolog-
ical information of the manifold does not.
TheΨknt are both gauge and diffeomorphism invariant, andwe will refer to them as s-knot states. Some authors use “spin-
network state" to refer to any and all states even if they sat-
isfy the diffeomorphism constraint in addition to the Gauss
constraint. These authors allow the context to specify which
mathematical structures are intended by the slightly ambigu-
ous term. It is important to keep this in mind when reading
quotes throughout this paper since, often, claims putatively
about spin-networks are really claims about s-knots. In the
context of the naïve interpretation, I will refer to the physical
objects represented by s-knot states as s-knots simpliciter.
Recall, from the previous subsection, that because the phys-
ical states – the spin-network states – are associated with a
mathematical network with a particular embedding in, the
naïf interpreted these states as representing a physical network
with a particular embedding in spacetime. However, the result
of making our states diffeomorphically invariant is that they
are no longer associated with any single graphical network in but with an equivalence class of them. So, if s-knot states
are not associated with a single embedded network in, what
physical thing in spacetime do these states represent?
7Technically, we do something stronger and group together all states
which are related by any map which is continuous, invertible and such that
it and its inverse are smooth except at all but a finite number of points. In
other words, we allow our mappings to act non-smoothly at the vertices of our
graphs (Rovelli 2004, p.232, 238–242, and 266).
Here, the literature becomes a bit opaque and pushes away
from the naïve interpretation. As a consequence of diffeo-
morphism invariance, Rovelli claims that s-knots are “abstract
graphs" and no longer “in space" (Rovelli 2004, p.19–21 and
264).8 Similarly, Wüthrich claims:
The (abstract) [s-knot states] result after one has
solved the Gauss and the spatial diffeomorphism
constraints... These [s-knot states] can be repre-
sented by abstract graphs. (2006, p.92)
What these authors are committing to by calling s-knots “ab-
stract" and failing to be in spacetime is twofold. First, the ap-
propriate mathematical framework for talking about the phys-
ical states of LQG are algebraic graphs, not topologically em-
bedded graphs. In other words, the graphical representation,
in the topological manifold, is misleading as it requires spec-
ifying some exact location for the network. Second and more
controversial, the physical objects denoted by s-knot states are
not objects in a substantival manifold. Rovelli and others infer
from the diffeomorphism invariance of s-knot states that the
states of LQG cannot represent substantival networks in a sub-
stantival spacetime (§3.2). However, it is important to keep in
mind that this inference is not required by the mathematics of
LQG and is a matter of philosophical taste. Since this point is
important in what follows, allow me to explain.
The diffeomorphism invariance of our states means that
the mathematical description of our physical system does not
refer to any particular spacetime points. Consequently, there
is nothing in the theory of LQG to say whether the system is
located at “these" rather than at “those" spacetime points. For
those familiar with the substantival-relational debate, this is
exactly the same situation that the substantivalist finds herself
in both GR and in Newtonian mechanics.
In the case of GR, Einstein’s field equations are invariant
under diffeomorphism transformations and in the case of New-
tonian mechanics, Newton’s equations of motion are invariant
under Galilean transformations.9 In both cases, the empirical
content of these theories is independent of the particular space-
time points at which the physical system is putatively located.
With respect to the empirical opacity of particular spacetime
points, there is nothing new in the move to LQG. Now, what
should be our attitude towards this fact? From the fact that our
theories are “blind" to the identity of the underlying spacetime
points, should we conclude that there are no spacetime points?
The substantivalist says “No". Let us consider Newton’s atti-
tude on absolute space:
Absolute space, of its own nature, without rela-
tion to anything external, always remains homo-
geneous and immovable. Relative space is any
moveable measure or dimension of this absolute
space; such a measure or dimension is determined
8See also Baez and Muniain (1994, p.448) and Wüthrich (2017, p.313).
9And of course, Newtonian mechanics can be cast into a generally co-
variant form but that is not the point. The point is that with respect to the then
known Galilean freedom, Newton (1687/1999) maintained the existence of an
absolute manifold.
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by our senses... But since these [absolute] parts of
space cannot be seen and cannot be distinguished
from one another by our senses, we use sensible
measures in their stead... Thus, instead of abso-
lute places andmotionswe use relative ones, which
is not inappropriate in ordinary human affairs, al-
though in philosophy abstraction from the senses
is required. (Newton 1687/1999, p.408–410)
According to Newton, though we can only ever measure
the relative position and velocities of bodies, these bodies, nonethe-
less, have absolute positions and velocities in absolute space-
time. Likewise, despite the diffeomorphism invariance of GR
many philosophers of GR have included spacetime points as
part of the theory’s ontology (Butterfield 1989, Maudlin 1990,
Brighouse 1994, 1997, Norton 2019). For instance, in the face
of the diffeomorphism invariance of GR, “sophisticated sub-
stantivalists" have tossed out the assumed primitive identity of
spacetime points rather than tossing out the points themselves
(Maidens 1992, Hoefer 1996). Now, I do not mean to sug-
gest that Newton’s view on substantival space is the same as
that held by contemporary substantivalists, but rather I mean
to draw our attention to the fact that since Newton, our physics
has not depended on whether or not our system was located at
“these" spacetime points rather than at “those" and despite this
independence, substantivalism has continued to be a defended
position. In moving to LQG, substantivalism faces no chal-
lenge that was not already present in GR and to some extent in
Newtonian mechanics.
If one has reasons – presumably empiricist reasons – to
interpret the diffeomorphism invariance of GR as indicating
that there is no spacetime manifold in GR, then one has sim-
ilar reasons for denying the manifold in the context of LQG.
Rovelli andWüthrich seem to be in this camp, though their rea-
soning from diffeomorphism invariance to the nonexistence of
spacetime points is not given. We are told that diffeomorphism
invariance demonstrates the nonexistence of the manifold but
are not told why. I should offer a cautionary word against fol-
lowing the path of Rovelli and Wüthrich and throwing away
spacetime points altogether.
While the diffeomorphism freedom inherent inGR andLQG
entails that the identities of particular spacetime points are em-
pirically opaque, the global topology of constrains the met-
rics available to us in GR as well as the Hilbert space of s-knots
in LQG. In both cases, the global properties of  are physi-
cally relevant. Now the question we need to ask is, can we
erase from our ontology the points composing the setwhile
not also erasing the global topological properties associated
with this set of points? While I suspect that this can be done,
one will likely be forced to adopt an unintuitive bit of meta-
physics. For instance, one way to maintain the existence of the
global topological properties of the set of points  without
also maintaining the underlying set is to insist that there can
be instantiated relations without the corresponding relata. In
this case the relations under consideration are monadic prop-
erties such as being “orientable" or “Hausdorff". In general,
to allow relations or properties without relata is tantamount to
admitting that there can be instances of redness without there
being any red objects.
With respect to the manifold , we would have to allow
“orientable" to be actualized without there being a manifold
to orient. Similarly, we would have to allow the property of
“Hausdorff" to be actualized without there being any space-
time points! Allow me to explain the difficulty with this sug-
gestion. A topological space is Hausdorff if and only if every
two points are included in disjoint open sets. Now, what would
it mean to say that the world is Hausdorff or that the property of
“Hausdorff" be actualized without there being any spacetime
points to satisfy the conditions of the definition? Again, per-
haps we can answer these questions and make sense of these
global properties without requiring an underlying set of space-
time points, but at the very least, one would need explain how
this is to be done.
In extending naïve substantivalism through the diffeormophism
constraint, we will diverge from the view expressed by Rovelli
and Wüthrich and in the spirit of Newton maintain that though
particular spacetime points are hidden from our physics, our
physical system – nonetheless – has an absolute location in the
spacetime manifold. In other words, a physical s-knot is an
embedded spin-network (or superposition of spin-networks)
which has an absolute location in the spacetime manifold even
though the s-knot state fails to tell us where it is embedded in
the manifold. On this view and in agreement with the history
of manifold substantivalism, the naïf believes that our physi-
cal system has a property, e.g. its absolute location, which is
not determined by our best physical theory. Again, I am not
saying that manifold substantivalists are right in thinking this
but merely to outline a philosophical position which has been
maintained and defended since Newton up through GR.
To be clear then, in LQG there is a mathematical manifold
and how we interpret this manifold is a philosophical ques-
tion. If the manifold disappears in LQG, then it disappears
in GR and Newtonian mechanics as well, and it does so as a
matter of interpretation, not quantization. Thus, when Daniele
Oriti claims “canonical loop quantum gravity ends up anyway
replacing the spacetime continuum with something more rad-
ical" (Oriti 2014, p.2, fn 3), he is merely expressing an aspect
of a particular interpretation of LQG. See §3.2 for more on this
interpretation.
Now, there is a related risk of confusion in LQG due to
the fusing together of two disparate ideas. On the one hand,
the models of LQG, ⟨,Ψknt()⟩, include a smooth manifoldwith a smooth 픰픲(2)-field defined on it. On the other hand, as
we shall see in the following section, the properties associated
with the states of this field are discrete. So, on the one hand,
there is a continuum manifold and, on the other hand, there
is a discrete geometry in the form of discrete spectra. If one
conflates these structures, one might mistakenly infer that the
continuum itself has been decomposed into disconnected dis-
crete blocks in accordance with our discrete geometry. This
inference is not entailed by the mathematics of LQG. Let us
now return to our third and final constraint, the “Hamiltonian"
constraint.
Unfortunately, there is no agreed upon Hamiltonian oper-
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ator with which to define the Hamiltonian constraint (Rovelli
2004, p.284–285). Nonetheless, we can still discuss some of
the effects of the Hamiltonian constraint on the theory. As was
the case with the previous two constraints, solving the Hamil-
tonian constraint will further contract the physical Hilbert space
of states. Similar to the diffeomorophism constraint, theHamil-
tonian constraint requires that our states be independent of our
putative time coordinate. What the diffeomorphism constraint
does for space the Hamiltonian constraint does for time. The
resulting freedom from the time parameter seems to suggest
that the physical systems of LQG are frozen in time. This
frozen dynamics sits at the heart of the various “problems of
time" in the LQG (Isham 1992, Kiefer 2009). Since the Hamil-
tonian constraint has not been solved, at the moment, s-knot
states are our most reliable guide to the physical structures of
canonical loop quantum gravity. In the following section, I
will present the observables of LQG and explain which prop-
erties of the states they are thought to represent. Before I do
this, allow me to review the interpretative transition which ac-
companies the move from the Gauss to the diffeomorphism
constraint.
After imposing the Gauss constraint, spin-network states
formally correspond with mathematically embedded networks
in a mathematical manifold. The naïf interprets these mathe-
matical structures as representing substantival networks with
their particular embeddings in spacetime. In solving the dif-
feomorphism constraint, ourmathematical states no longer cor-
respond with particular embedded networks in our mathemat-
ical manifold. The diffeomorphism constraint erases the for-
mal connection between these two bits of mathematics: vec-
tor states and topologically embedded mathematical networks.
Despite this, the naïf interprets s-knot vector states as repre-
senting substantival networks, though, admittedly, not their
particular embeddings. According to the naïf, in moving from
spin-network states to s-knot states, one does not change on-
tology, but rather, one merely removes from the mathematics
of LQG, empirically opaque aspects of substantival ontology
– namely, where the embeddings occur.
2.4. Observables
Since LQG is a quantum theory aimed at replacing GR, we
would like for it to include observables which approximate the
geometric structure of spacetime. Area and volume observ-
ables have been defined in such a way that both spin-network
states and s-knot states are eigenvectors of them (Rovelli 2004,
p.248, 262 and Rovelli and De Pietri 1996, p.15). Consider the
following operator:
̂(퐒) ≡ lim
푛→∞
푛∑
푘
√√√√√−(∫퐒(푛)푘 푑휎1푑휎2휖푎푏푐 휕푥
푎(휎⃗)
휕휎1
휕푥푏(휎⃗)
휕휎2
훿
훿푖푐(휎⃗)
)2
(2)
The way to interpret ̂(퐒) is that we are measuring the
value of some property, ̂, indexed by some spatial surface,
퐒. The ̂(퐒) operator is the concrete “area" observable of
LQG. The reason for italicizing area and volume is to distin-
guish the operators named by them from the classical pseudo-
Riemannian structures we normally intend. I call the area ob-
servable “concrete" since it is defined in terms of embedded
structures in the manifold,. In fact, one reason for present-
ing this equation is to illustrate its dependence on themanifold:
the integral is defined in terms of a measure, 푑휎1푑휎2, over an
embedded surface, 퐒. Moreover, the operator 훿
훿푖푐 (휎⃗) whichacts on the states, Ψ, is explicitly dependent on the values of
the coordinate functions (휎⃗) over 퐒.10
The area observable acts on spin-network states and has a
spectrum of area eigenvalues:
̂(퐒)Ψ ≡ ∑
푛∈{퐒∩Γ(푥⃗)}
√
푗푛(푗푛 + 1)Ψ. (3)
Embedded spin-networks carry charge (푗푛) on their links andso contribute to the value of ̂(퐒). An embedded network will
affect the value of ̂(퐒) for a given surface in two ways: first,
the number of its links which intersect the surface ({퐒∩Γ(푥⃗)})
will change the number of things summed over in (3), and sec-
ond, as we change the gravitational charge (푗푛) of the links, weaffect the size of each term in the sum. Thus, it is possible to
increase the pseudo-Riemannian area of 퐒 and yet not increase̂. For instance, consider a single embedded network with a
straight link which happens to cross a flat circular surface once.
If we had a metric, we could change the pseudo-Riemannian
size of the circle by doubling its radius, though, since we do
not change the number of times with which the surface inter-
sects the network nor the charge of the network, we will not
increase the physical area defined by ̂. Conversely, if we
keep the pseudo-Riemannian size of 퐒 fixed but increase the
charge of the link, the area associated with 퐒 will increase.
These results are similar to the situation in electromagnetism:
to increase the electrical charge of a surface, wemust add more
charge and not simply increase the pseudo-Riemannian size of
the surface. In the same way, to increase the area of a region,
we must change our network, not the bounds of our integra-
tion (Rovelli 2004, p.269–270). A similar situation holds for
our volume observable: integrating over a larger region does
not necessarily produce a larger volume.
The remarkable achievement of LQG and the reason for
naming these observables area and volume is that they produce
eigenvalues which approximate their Riemannian namesakes
when acting on certain states. For instance, there are special
spin-network states such that (Rovelli 2004, p.268):
̂(퐒)Ψ = (픸(푔,퐒) + 푂(푙푝∕푙))Ψ (4)
̂(퐑)Ψ = (핍 (푔, 푅) + 푂(푙푝∕푙))Ψ (5)
10The operators in (1) and (2) are Rovelli’s, but there are other area
and volume operators which one might consider. Importantly, Ashtekar and
Lewandowski (1998) have defined a pair of geometry operators which disagree
with Rovelli’s and rely more directly on aspects of the manifold.
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Here, 픸(푔,퐒) is the pseudo-Riemannian area of surface, 퐒,
given by themetric 푔 and 핍 (푔, 푅), the pseudo-Riemannian vol-
ume. As we pull back from the Planck scale (푙 ≫ 푙푝), thevalues of our observables approach their pseudo-Riemannian
counterparts. However, not all spin-network states satisfy ei-
ther of these equations let alone both. The spin-network states
which do satisfy these equations are called “weave-states",Ψ푤,and they form a countable basis for our spin-network Hilbert
space. Consequently, a generic spin-network state can be ex-
pressed as a superposition of weave-states, a superposition of
semi-classical geometries.
Throughout the remainder of this paper, I will no longer
italicize ‘area’ and ‘volume’ in reference to the observables of
LQG. I will refrain from doing so in order to signal that, if LQG
is correct, physical areas and volumes are more accurately de-
scribed by ̂(퐒) and ̂(퐑) than by their pseudo-Riemannian
counterparts.
An important prediction of LQG is that the area of sur-
faces and the volume of regions come in discrete Planck-sized
packages. This comes about because the graph of a network
is modified by adding or subtracting whole numbered links or
nodes from it. And since the 푗푛 in equation (3) only takes oninteger values, a network can only add discrete units of area
to any given surface. Similar reasoning holds for the volume
observable.
In order for our observables to be “Dirac" and arguably
physically meaningful, we need them to be invariant along the
constraint surfaces of our theory. This just means that our
physical observables should enjoy the same invariances as our
physical states. Therefore, the observables of LQG should be
both gauge and diffeomorphism invariant. Unfortunately, our
observables are explicitly dependent on particular surfaces, 퐒,
and regions,퐑 (Rovelli 2004, p.266), and thus fail to be invari-
ant under diffeomorphisms. Rovelli has offered some sugges-
tions for how to construct diffeomorphism invariant observ-
ables11 and claims that, once we have done so, the resulting
observables will make no reference to particular regions and
surfaces in the manifold. According to Rovelli, these observ-
ables will depend only on the algebraic information of the s-
knot states (Rovelli 2004, p.262–265). However, constructing
these observables is both complicated and “useless" according
to Rovelli (p.266) for the spectra will be the same either way.
Rovelli argues that the area and volume operators are “partial
observables" and share the same spectra as their “complete"
coordinate-independent counterparts. According to Rovelli,
partial observables give us half of what we expect from their
complete counterparts: we are given the set of available eigen-
values but are unable to calculate the exact eigenvalue of any
particular s-knot state (p.263–265). This imposes a limitation
on what we can say about any particular s-knot state, though it
places no barrier on what we can say about s-knots in general.
In general then, s-knots produce areas and volumes in discrete
units (eq.(3)) through their charged links and nodes. It seems
however, that there is some debate regarding the appropriate-
11For instance, Rovelli suggests that we might use the gauge freedom of
the matter fields to make the observables diffeomorphically invariant (Rovelli
and Peush 1998, p.7; Rovelli 2004, p.266).
ness of using equations (4) and (5), defined on spin-networks,
to infer properties of s-knots. For more on this debate see,
Rovelli (2007), Dittrich and Thiemann (2009) and Crowther
(2016).
The first half of this paper had two primary objectives. The
first objective was to explain the formal structure of LQG as an
introductory aide to philosophers and, the second, to explain
this formal structure while highlighting the substantival inter-
pretation of the theory. I hope to have said enough to provide
a clear though admittedly bird’s-eye perspective of the formal
structure of LQG sufficient for beginning a philosophical anal-
ysis of the theory’s ontology. In the second half of this paper, I
will (1) modify the naïve interpretation in order to bring it into
alignment with substantivalist attitudes in GR, (2) present two
relational interpretations of LQG, and (3) answer, for various
interpretations, the questions raised in §1: does spacetime exist
fundamentally, do spin-networks (s-knots) exist fundamentally
and does spacetime emerge from them. But before turning to
these other tasks, let us remind ourselves of the naïve interpre-
tation.
According to the naïf, s-knots live on a substantival space-
time manifold and carry gravitational charge along their links
and nodes. The more charge a network has, the more volume
it produces. The networks of LQG build spacetime geometry
one volume at a time as geometry “radiates" from them (Figure
3). Since there is a lower bound to how much area and volume
a physical network can carry, spacetime can only be geometri-
cally parsed up to a certain scale – below which, no geometry
is defined.
Figure 3: A series of networks: gravitationally charged links and nodes.
Each node defines a volume of space and each link, an area. In this case, the
network defines a cubic volume though, in the literature, one is more likely
to see tetrahedra.
The ontology of this interpretation is not so different from
substantival interpretations of GR. In GR, spacetime is de-
scribed by ⟨, 푔⟩, whichwe can interpret as describing a phys-
ically substantial manifold bearing a physical geometry. In
moving to naïve-LQG, we keep the physically substantial man-
ifold but replace the physical geometry, associated with the
gravitational field 푔, with a quantum geometry, produced by
the charged networks Ψknt.
3. Interpretations and Spacetime Disappearance
In this section, I will provide six additional interpretations
of LQG; four are substantival and two are relational. Each
of these interpretations differs from one another and from the
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naïve interpretation in what they take spacetime to be.
3.1. Substantival LQG
In the following, I will amend the naïve interpretation by
thickening the notion of spacetime. Rather than being a struc-
ture literally modeled by the bare manifold,, with no physi-
cal geometry, spacetime will be required to include some kind
of geometry or quantum geometry. The motivation for thick-
ening our notion of spacetime to include something like a met-
rical structure or physical geometry is that, without it, space-
time lacks a causal structure, spatial lengths and durations of
time, all of which seem to be constitutive of spacetime. Con-
sequently, perhaps spacetime is better modeled by the pair of
objects ⟨, 푔⟩ or, perhaps, by ⟨,Ψknt⟩. In the following,I will modify the naïve interpretation in four ways in order to
accommodate these two options. Since the manifold plays an
essential role in modeling substantival spacetime for each of
these four interpretations, these interpretations will be classi-
fied as instances of manifold substantivalism.
I do not claim that these four interpretations are the only
possible elaborations of the naïve position. These interpreta-
tions have been chosen as they provide an informative van-
tage point from which to interpret the mathematics of LQG
and evaluate the claim that spacetime emerges in LQG. Since
I will be cycling through interpretations, I will thereby be cy-
cling through what ‘spacetime’ means and how spacetime is
formally represented in the theory. For this reason, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind which interpretation is being discussed.
According to the S1 interpretation, spacetime is the compo-sition of a substantival manifold bearing a classical geometry
represented by the ordered pair ⟨, 푔⟩. On this interpretation,
both and 푔 represent physical things which jointly come to-
gether to form spacetime. If spacetime is as according to S1,since fundamentally there is no metrical structure described by
LQG, there is no spacetime fundamentally. Moreover, as part
of S1, I will stipulate that the models ⟨,Ψknt⟩ represent acomposite “quantum spacetime".
According to the S2 interpretation, spacetime is exactly asit is in S1 except that the models ⟨, 푔⟩ represent a noncom-posite classical spacetime while the models ⟨,Ψknt⟩ repre-sent a noncomposite quantum spacetime. Here, the pieces of
our models, , 푔, and Ψknt, do not represent distinct itemsof ontology. This interpretation, as well as S4 below, refusesto infer from the mathematical composition of our models a
corresponding composition in ontology. For these interpreta-
tions, there is only one thing represented by our models, and it
cannot be ontologically parsed according to the mathematical
categories of topology and geometry.
An analogy might help. Just as a person’s name is decom-
posed into two parts, the given and the family names, the per-
son herself cannot be ontologically decomposed along these
lines. The given name does not refer to some part of a person’s
ontology while family name refers to what remains. So also,
according to S2, ‘⟨,Ψknt⟩’ is a name which refers to onething which cannot be divided according to the parts of the
name. Whether or not S2 is correct in viewing spacetime thisway is besides the point. S2 is a possible interpretation whose
ontology differs in important ways from the other interpreta-
tions being considered. The difference between S1 and S2 thenis whether or not quantum spacetime is composite, composed
of two things, and this difference is essential to the existence
of spin-networks (s-knots) as I will explain in a moment.
There are two motivations for the following interpretations
(S3 and S4). First, if the physical models of LQG include afour-dimensional basal manifold, then the physical structure
being represented is enough like a “container” for the substan-
tivalist to think that spacetime lives on in LQG. Second, in
quantizing the electromagnetic field, we did not get rid of the
field from our ontology but rather we simply gave the field a
new, quantum, description. So also, according to the following
interpretations, spacetime does not go missing in quantization
but merely gets a new description: ⟨,Ψknt⟩. On this view,spacetime is like the electromagnetic field and unlike phlogis-
ton insofar as it is a piece of ontology which survives the evo-
lution in our understanding of the world.
According to the 푆3 interpretation, spacetime is the com-position of a substantival manifold and a quantum geometry
represented by ⟨,Ψknt⟩. Since spacetime is a composite,both andΨknt represent physical things: there is a substanti-val manifold with a substantival network. The only significant
difference between the S1 and S3 interpretations is whether werequire spacetime to have classical or quantum properties. The
difference between the S3 and S4 interpretations lies merely inwhether or not we take spacetime to be composite.
According to the S4 interpretation, spacetime is a noncom-posite structure represented by ⟨,Ψknt⟩. In this case, neither nor Ψknt represent anything physical on their own. In par-ticular, the states, Ψknt, do not represent physical things calleds-knots but rather these states simply provide some of the req-
uisite mathematical structure for representing the quantum ge-
ometric properties of spacetime. As a unit, ⟨,Ψknt⟩ repre-sents spacetime according to S4, just as ⟨, 푔⟩, as a unit, rep-resents spacetime according to S2.Importantly, these four less naïve interpretations are both
allowed by the mathematics of LQG and disagree with each
other as well as with the original naïve interpretation in what
ontology they take to exist fundamentally. (For a summary see
Table 1.)
• According to the naïve interpretation, the manifold,
devoid of any metrical structure, represents substantival
spacetime. Spacetime does not disappear in LQG, and
there are physically substantial s-knots. On this view,
whether or not geometry is classical or quantum is irrel-
evant for spacetime.
• According to S1, spacetime disappears fundamentally inLQG. Spacetime, within this view, requires a classical
physical geometry, and quantum spacetime requires a
quantum geometry. Since themodels of LQG are ⟨,Ψknt⟩,there is no spacetime fundamentally in LQG. Moreover,
since quantum spacetime is composite, there are phys-
ically substantial s-knots embedded in the substantival
manifold.
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• According to S2, both spacetime and quantum spacetimeare substantival and noncomposite structures. Since the
models of LQG are ⟨,Ψknt⟩, there is no spacetimefundamentally. Moreover, since quantum spacetime is
noncomposite, there are no s-knots.
• According to S3, substantival spacetime is a compositestructure represented by ⟨,Ψknt⟩ and, as such, space-time exists fundamentally. Since spacetime is compos-
ite, the states Ψknt represent physical networks embed-ded in the substantival manifold represented by.
• According to S4, substantival spacetime is a noncom-posite structure represented by ⟨,Ψknt⟩ and, as such,spacetime exists fundamentally, though substantival s-
knots do not.
As we can see, the theory of LQG entails neither that space-
time disappears, nor that there are physical networks. Whether
or not there are such things depends on our interpretation of
spacetimewith respect to themodels ⟨,Ψknt⟩. Though space-time disappears for some of these accounts, on every account
we are left with a fundamental substantival structure.
Now, the difference between these interpretations is not a
matter of semantics as ‘spacetime’ is not an empty label that
we are free to attach to any structure we wish. Space, time and
spacetime are not merely theoretical objects which show up in
our most advanced physical theory but are objects or structures
which tie together much of the way human beings conceive re-
ality. The point is, if ‘spacetime’ like ‘blem’ is an empty label,
it would not matter what we decided to tag it with – the issue
would indeed be a matter of semantics. But ‘spacetime’ is not
an empty label any more than is ‘the president of the United
States’ – it matters to the structure of reality what these labels
in fact name. It matters to the nature of reality if ‘the president
of the United States’ names a person rather than a tree or sea
creature. Why this is the case is because the president of the
United States is also thought to be the commander-in-chief of
the US military and to sleep in the White House. The term
‘the president of the United States’ is not an empty label but
comes with metaphysical and ontological commitments. So
too, the terms ‘space’, ‘time’ and ’spacetime’ are not empty
labels but come with various expectations and commitments.
For instance, it is often claimed that space grounds the dis-
tinction between abstract and concrete objects, or that causes
come earlier in time than their effects, or that no object can
exist in more than one place in space but can exist in more
than one place in time. The point is that much of the way we
view reality is tied up with our notions of space and time and
so it makes a difference to our understanding of reality what
physical structure we label as ‘space’, ‘time’ or ‘spacetime’.
In particular, it makes a difference to the nature of reality if
spacetime ceases to exist fundamentally, if it is emergent or if
it is merely an illusion. Thus, in choosing one of the interpre-
tations on offer one is not making a choice of semantics but a
choice in how to view reality.
The final two interpretations, to which I will now turn, di-
verge much more radically from the naïve interpretation than
the various S푖 interpretations. According to the following in-terpretations, the manifold,, is a mathematical artifact and
does not encode any physical information; spacetime is rela-
tional according to these interpretations and is modeled by ei-
ther 푔 or Ψknt.
3.2. Rovellian LQG
The following interpretation is largely inspired by Carlo
Rovelli; however, I do not claim that the views expressed here
are exactly his own. Thus, this interpretation is Rovellian,
though perhaps not Rovelli’s. The Rovellian interpretation has
become the received interpretation among philosophers of LQG,
being assumed in part, if not in whole, in almost all philosoph-
ical work on LQG: Huggett andWüthrich (2013), Lam and Es-
feld (2013), Crowther (2014, 2016, 2018), Norton (2017),Würthich
(2006, 2017), Wüthrich and Lam (2018) and Le Bihan (2019).
According to the Rovellian interpretation, the diffeomor-
phism freedom found in both GR and LQG is evidence that
is something like a gauge artifact and ought not be interpreted
as encoding physical structure. Since the s-knot states make no
reference to any particular embedding, Rovelli concludes:
In fact (the spacetime manifold) has no physi-
cal interpretation, it is just a mathematical device,
a gauge artifact... There are not spacetime points
at all. The Newtonian notions of space and time
have disappeared... the spacetime coordinates 푥⃗
and 푡 have no physical meaning...
(2004, p.74)
WhatNewton called “space," andMinkowski called
“spacetime," is unmasked: it is nothing but a dy-
namical object – the gravitational field...
...the gravitational field is the same entity as space-
time.
(2004, p.9, 18)
However, just because does not play a role in determining
what physical values are observed, it is not required that we
treat as being a mathematical artifact. How to treat gauge
orbits and related mathematical structure is a thorny philo-
sophical issue, and it is far from settled that all such orbits
ought to be taken nonrealistically. Rovelli recognizes this in
“Halfway Through the Woods" (1997) when he acknowledges
that, though LQG and GR are diffeomorphically invariant the-
ories, one might still insist that there is a physical background
manifold which happens to be unobservable. Though Rovelli
acknowledges that the existence of an unobservable manifold
is logically possible, it it not the position he endorses. Accord-
ing to the Rovellian interpretation presented here, there is no
physical manifold represented by.
According to Rovelli, spacetime in GR is just the gravita-
tional field and in quantizing it we are quantizing spacetime it-
self (Rovelli 2004, p.17) rather than some aspect of spacetime.
Consequently, since there is no classical gravitational field in
LQG, there is no classical spacetime either. Fortunately, since
the weave-states produce formal expressions which approxi-
mate those of classical geometry, equations (4) and (5), there
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is a sense in which spacetime arises or is recovered from the
quantum phenomena of LQG. When (푙 ≫ 푙푝) and the quan-tum spacetime happens to be described by a weave-state, the
world looks classical in the sense that the predictions of LQG
are numerically similar to those of GR. In this way, we might
say that spacetime is recovered or is “emergent," according to
LQG in the classical regime.
However, we must not interpret claims to the effect that
spacetime is recovered, in this mathematical sense, as necessi-
tating that spacetime, as a new item of ontology, emerges in the
classical regime. When ‘recovered’ is understood in the way I
have used it, all that is entailed is that spacetime qua the for-
mal gravitational field is a mathematically effective structure
for modeling a certain class of phenomena. Onemight endorse
the additional view according to which effective structures at
low energies are genuinely emergent objects of our ontology
and distinct in kind from whatever happens to be fundamental.
Or contrarily, one might view effective structures as merely
useful fictions. For more on effective structures and space-
time emergence in LQG, see Huggett and Wüthrich (2013),
Wüthrich and Lam (2018), Le Bihan (2019), as well as (Nor-
ton, in preparation).
Much of what I have just said regarding Rovelli’s position
can be modified and applied to some of the S푖 interpretations.In particular, according to S1 and S2, classical spacetime isformally recovered when our physical system evolves to take
the form of a weave-state and when our measuring devices
are operating in the classical, low-energy regime. If our inter-
pretation includes physically substantial s-knots as it does in
S1, then we might say that classical spacetime emerges in thelow energy regime when our physical s-knots take the form of
weave-states.12
Now, since physically embedded spin-networks and s-knots
are physically substantial insofar as they are comprised of points
from the physical manifold, without a substantival manifold (a
la Rovelli), one does not have substantival networks. While
Rovelli does not make this argument himself, he seems to en-
dorse its conclusion:
Such geometrical pictures [of topological networks]
are helps for the intuition, but there is no micro-
scopic geometry at the Planck scale and these pic-
tures should not be taken too literally in my opin-
ion. (Rovelli 2011, p.4)
Additionally, while Rovelli describes spacetime like a t-shirt
which, when approached, reveals an underlyingweave of threads,
he cautions against taking these weaves “as a realistic proposal
for the microstates of a given macroscopic geometry [space-
time]" (2004, p.268–269). Indeed, for Rovelli, there is no shirt
since there is no basal structure but only “fields on fields" (2004,
p.9). I interpret these quotes from Rovelli as cautioning us
against naïvely reifying the topological networks in. Con-
trary to the naïve interpretation as well as S1 and S3, on the
12Here I have been sloppy as weave-states, as I have defined them, are
a kind of spin-network, not a kind of s-knot. By “weave-state", I am really
referring to the diffeomorphism invariant version of a weave-state.
Rovellian interpretation, the world does not contain gravita-
tionally charged networks but rather just the quantum geomet-
ric relations defined by them.
According to the Rovellian, spin-networks and s-knots are
mathematical tools useful for encoding the properties of quan-
tized relational spacetime. Both the vector states of LQG and
the geometrically embedded spin-networks in represent quan-
tum geometric properties of quantum spacetime, solely in terms
of the algebraic information they contain. Consequently, no
isolated part of a topological network, not an isolated point or
line, is to be taken as physically salient on its own. The net-
work, as a whole, is physically salient but only insofar as it
maps onto a vector state in the Hilbert space of LQG.13 For
the Rovellian then, there are not two physical things, quan-
tum spacetime and physical s-knots, but only quantum space-
time represented by mathematical s-knot states. Contrary to
the Rovellian, the substantivalist is committed to there being
substantival spacetime points in addition to the quantum ge-
ometry represented by s-knot states. It is this additional layer
of ontology, provided by the manifold, which allows the sub-
stantivalist (S1 and S3) to distinguish the quantum gravitationalproperties represented by the abstract s-knot states and physi-
cal networks composed of spacetime points.
Allow me to emphasize that for the Rovellian, what ontol-
ogy there is, is given by a vector state in our Hilbert space.
Since our states represent quantum geometry and not single
nodes or single links, the Rovellian cannot include nodes and
links as items of ontology. That being said, the mathemati-
cal information contained in the links and nodes of an embed-
ded spin-network remain to some degree in our s-knot states in
the form of degrees of freedom (퐾, 푐) (Rovelli 2004, p.241).
The network ontology which the substantivalist makes essen-
tial use of is destroyed by the Rovellian leaving only a remnant
in the form of internal degrees of freedom in the state. Thus,
under the received, Rovellian interpretation, one cannot say
that there is an ontology of links and nodes which combine in
such and such a way to somehow construct classical spacetime.
However, Wüthrich (2017) and Huggett and Wüthrich (2013)
endorse the Rovellian interpretation, though they continue to
speak of there being fundamental nodes which are associated
with individualized volumes of spacetime. This is a mistake on
the Rovellian interpretation as fundamental ontology is cap-
tured only by the states of the theory and not also by nodes
and links. This is one aspect of the ontological inconsistency
which one finds in the literature on LQG and which I hope to
correct. If one wants nodes and links as items of ontology, in
addition to what the states of the theory represent, one has a
variety of manifold substantivalist positions to choose from.
Now, there remains conceptual space to modify the Rovel-
lian interpretation so that spacetime does not in fact disappear;
let us call this the Rovellian* interpretation. In considering the
interpretations S3 and S4, I noted that what we discovered in
13Caveat: some sub-networks can be treated as being physically meaning-
ful, but only because if we were to extract them from their network, they too
would have a copy of themselves in the Hilbert space of LQG. Such networks
are not physically meaningful as proper parts of a network but are physically
meaningful as extracted networks in their own right.
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quantum electrodynamics was not the disappearance of elec-
tromagnetism but its quantum nature. So too, a relationalist
like Rovelli might very well claim that in LQG we discover
not the disappearance of spacetime but simply its quantum na-
ture. On this view, spacetime is just that relational structure
represented by Ψknt. It is very important that we not rushpast this interpretive option for it makes a difference in how
we conceive of reality. There are important conceptual conse-
quences if spacetime really ceases to exist fundamentally (Nor-
ton 2017).
In §1, I noted that there are two senses in which spacetime
might be substantival. The first sense identifies the manifold
as being essential for substantivalism where the second sense
identifies the ontologically independent metric field as being
the heir of substantival spacetime in GR. I have not yet said
anything about this second sense in the transition to LQG. The
primary motivations for treating the metric field as substan-
tival, in the context of GR, is that it carries energy and can
exist independent of matter fields. In other words, spacetime’s
existence is not mediated by relations between matter fields or
degrees of freedom in those fields. Now, can we carry this rea-
soning over to the s-knots of LQG? In other words, can one toss
out the manifold as the Rovellian does and yet maintain that
substantival spacetime lives on in LQG in the form of Ψknt?I will not attempt to answer this question; though, I suppose
“Yes".
In summary, according to the Rovellian interpretation, the
states (Ψknt) of the theory represent a relational structure rep-resented by the “quantum geometry" of equations (4) and (5)
and do not represent physical networks. Spacetime does not
exist fundamentally according to the Rovellian though it does
for the Rovellian*. For ease, I have included all the relevant
interpretations and their respective ontologies in Table 1.
4. Emergence
In order for spacetime to emerge from the spin-networks (s-
knots) of LQG, it must be the case that spin-networks (s-knots)
exist while spacetime fails to exist fundamentally. I hope that it
has become clear that whether or not these conditions are sat-
isfied depends rather heavily on one’s interpretation of the the-
ory. In the following, I assess the claim that spacetime emerges
from spin-networks (s-knots), under the various interpretations
considered in this paper.
• Naïve: since spacetime does not disappear fundamen-
tally, the emergence claim is false.
• S1: spacetime is a candidate for emergence. If space-time emergence is accurately described by the account at
the end of section §3.2, then spacetime emerges, in the
low energy regime, from the non-spatiotemporal spin-
networks (s-knots) so long as the physical system takes
the form of a weave-state.
• S2: since there are no s-knots, the emergence claim isfalse. Rather, classical spacetime emerges from quan-
tum spacetime as we might expect of our quantum the-
ories.
Table 1
Interpretations, Ontologies and Emergence
Interpretation Fundamental
spacetime?
Spin-
networks?
Emergence
from spin-
networks?
Naïve ✓ ✓ 7
S1 7 ✓ ✓
S2 7 7 7
S3 ✓ ✓ 7
S4 ✓ 7 7
Rovellian 7 7 7
Rovellian* ✓ 7 7
• S3: since spacetime does not disappear fundamentally,the emergence claim is false.
• S4: since spacetime does not disappear fundamentallyand since there are no s-knots, the emergence claim is
false.
• Rovellian: since there are no s-knots qua an ontology of
links and nodes, the emergence claim is false. Rather,
classical spacetime emerges from, something like “quan-
tum spacetime" as we might expect of any of our quan-
tum theories.
• Rovellian*: since spacetime does not disappear funda-
mentally and since there are no s-knots, the emergence
claim is false.
푆1 is the purest realization of the evocative claim that space-time emerges from non-spatiotemporal networks. The ontol-
ogy of this interpretation allows us to say that spacetime emerges,
in the low energy limit, from the substantival networks as clas-
sical geometry radiates from its “quantum-gravitationally” charged
nodes and links. There is a related, though deflated, reading of
the emergence claim which is true of the S2 and the Rovel-lian interpretations – namely, that classical spacetime emerges
from quantum spacetime. The emergence claims which began
this paper promised something extraordinary, but the only way
I see to deliver on it is to adopt S1. Outside of S1, the emer-gence claim is either false or deflated; see Table 1.
5. Conclusion
In §2, I provided an exposition of LQG expressed in the
language of the naïve interpretation. That interpretation de-
scribes the world as including a substantival manifold called
spacetimewhich contains spatially embedded charged networks.
These networks are responsible for the quantum geometric prop-
erties of spacetime. In §3, I provided a series of substanti-
val and relational interpretations of LQG. These interpreta-
tions differ from one another and the original naïve interpreta-
tion in what they take spacetime to be and what they take the
states of the theory to represent. Importantly, I have shown that
there are clear and intuitive interpretations of LQG according
to which spacetime does not disappear fundamentally. In §4, I
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analyzed the claim that in LQG, spacetime emerges from spin-
networks and found it to be false, or deflated, for all but one in-
terpretation. This analysis is important as most philosophical
work on LQG assumes the Rovellian interpretation and does
not seem to be aware that there are viable alternatives. More-
over, this same literature also endorses the claim that spacetime
emerges from spin-networks – which, when taken literally, is
false on the Rovellian view.
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